GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
VOLUME

8

1978

Issu 3

THE ARAB BOYCOTT AND THE INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSE
INTRODUCTION

The Arab boycott, though dating from the 1920's, took its present
form in the 1950's. At that time, the primary boycott-the ban against
direct or indirect trade or investment between Arab countries and
Israel-was expanded to include a secondary boycott-the ban against
trade or investment between Arab countries and all third-country
business enterprises making a "material contribution" to Israel's
economy or engaging in proscribed commercial relations with the
Israeli Government or Israeli businesses. Companies which failed to
comply with the ban were blacklisted. Businesses subject to blacklisting under the secondary boycott included those owning or operating
facilities in Israel, those providing technical services to or acting as
an agent for an Israeli company, or those refusing to reply to questions of the Central Boycott Office, the coordinating arm of the Arab
boycott. The secondary boycott was further extended to a so-called
tertiary boycott, which banned purchases by Arab nationals of products from a business acting in accordance with the boycott, if the
products of that business included components made by a blacklisted
foreign firm.
As the effect of the boycott became more noticeable, countermeasures were proposed in the United States and abroad. These proposals were not directed against the right of the Arab nations to
refuse to trade with Israel-the primary boycott; rather they were
designed to hinder compliance with the boycott by non-Arab businesses
and governments.
The United States Congress first addressed the Arab boycott in
1965, when it amended the Export Control Act of 1949, declaring the
United States opposition to the boycott and requiring American firms
to report to the Department of Commerce any requests by Arab
nations to comply with the boycott. In response to the increasing
economic power of the Arab world and the more efficient administration of the boycott, the United States has for the past two years
analyzed and debated the Arab boycott. This debate culminated in
two significant pieces of legislation: the antiboycott provisions of the
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Tax Reform Act of 1976 (TRA)
Amendments of 1977 (EAA).
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and the Export Administration

The application of these legislative responses to the Arab boycott
(and perhaps to other boycotts) may have far-reaching effects on
United States foreign policy and economic interests. The following
symposium of articles will analyze the development of United States
responses to the Arab boycott, examine these responses as well as
those of other nations, and discuss the possible impact of international
boycotts and antiboycott laws on United States business interests.
This symposium begins with an examination by Professor Henry J.
Steiner of the political processes involved in the formulation of the
EAA. Stanley J. Marcuss comments upon the intricacies of the administrationand interpretationof the EAA by the Commerce Department.
Eugene A. Ludwig and John T. Smith, II analyze the effect of the
EAA on the business community. James M. Johnstone and Jon Paugh
focus on the antitrust implications of the EAA, while Carl Estes, II
discusses the antiboycott provisions of the TRA and the 1978 Treasury
Department Guidelines. Nancy Turck, in a comparative approach, examines how other nations have responded to the Arab boycott. Finally,
a student Note by Robert S. Wayne discusses the extraterritorialapplication of the EAA. The editors of Volume 8 offer this symposium
as a precursor to a dispassionate examination of the complex and
highly emotional area of internationalboycotts.
The Editors

